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Abstract 
The delivery of human services occurs through a complex and often volatile system characterised by both competing 
and cooperating efforts.  A recent strategic intention of government has been to integrate disparate service providers 
and programs into a more effective and efficient system using competitive funding regimes. A program of 
amalgamation has also been forecast and promoted as a further mechanism by which to link up smaller agencies 
thus creating economy and efficiency in the scale and scope of their service modes.  Despite the current reliance on 
competitive funding models and amalgamation as the preferred ways forward for the sector little is known about their 
integrative capacity including their ability to predict outcomes and their consequences : the ‘unknown unknowns’.  
Drawing on an extensive data set of human services integration initiatives in Queensland, Australia, this paper 
examines the impact of government policy and service models and the risks arising from the tensions between 
competition and accountability on the one hand and the established good will and trust on the other.  It is argued that 
unresolved, these tensions can lead to a weakening of the social infrastructure and make the system more 
vulnerable to inherent systemic risks.  
The paper finds that government’s efforts to externalise risk to the non-government sector leads to fragmentation of 
the service system and fractured collaborative capability.  These unintended outcomes themselves have the 
unintended consequence of leaving governments disconnected from the service system and unable to provide the 
leadership role and direction necessary for sustained integration.  Moreover, facilitating such a leadership role is 
undermined by behaviours that are directly contrary to collective integration models.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no question that governments have been a major contributor to the progress that has been achieved in 
many countries in terms of the delivery of education, health and other social services.  Increasingly, however, a range 
of factors including, in particular, fiscal restraints, persistent and intractable problems – the ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel and 
Webber, 1973) as well as new emerging issues such as climate change, challenge capacities to provide efficient and 
effective services. These problems defy conventional, linear problem solving processes; go beyond the capacity of 
any one organisation, and often sector, to understand and respond to and therefore demand greater integration 
between diverse stakeholder groups.  
 
Integration has long been a goal of public administrators seeking to build coherency between units and organisations. 
Jennings and Crane (1994) for example, described it as the perennial holy grail of public administration. Several 
authors have traced this interest to the 1800s, with subsequent ongoing periodic spikes in concentration (Peters, 
1998; Lynn, 1980; Tierney, 1970). In 2011, integration is back high on the Australian agenda. This is evident in recent 
policy statements (for example,  Australian Public Service Commission, 2009) and key Prime Ministerial speeches on 
improved social service delivery via whole-of-government integration, partnerships, networks and collaboration. The 
social services are a prominent locale for integrative effort. Although, the push for integration cuts across many 
service areas, homelessness provides a recent high profit presents as a recent example, where policy initiatives draw 
on particularly horizontal integration to address homelessness (see for example, the Federal Government’s White 
Paper The Road Home, the Queensland Government’s Responding to Homelessness Strategy and the Victorian 
Government’s Opening Doors). The demand for integration is not unique to the national government, although it has 
often taken the lead in setting the joined-up agenda through its use of funding regimes and rhetoric. State 
governments and the not-for-profit sector have all made attempts to address their myriad concerns using similar 
integrative approaches, albeit with localised departures to the theme.  Within this reform context, the not-for-profit 
sector has been cast as a critical partner in the delivery of services, and therefore need to be added to the integrated 
mix.  
 
Using integration to solve service fragmentation, reduce duplication and the burgeoning cost of social services has 
had strong intuitive appeal to public administrators and practitioners alike (Walfogel, 1997; Martinson, 1999; Phillips, 
Milligan and Jones, 2009). Provan and Milward (1995:2) provide the integration rationale: 
The prevailing view among many service delivery professionals is that by integrating services through a 
network of provider agencies linked through referrals, case management and joint programs, clients will gain 
the benefits of reduced fragmentation and greater coordination of services. 
Alongside the aggressive pursuit of service and systems integration governments have introduced a 
number of other policies aimed at strengthening the capacity of the not-for-profit sector (NFP) to deliver 
services to required performance levels.  Central to this reform package are harmonised regulatory processes, 
the reduction of red-tape and greater transparency (The Third Sector Magazine, 2011). Aligned with the latter, 
there has also been a concerted effort at both the national and state levels to embed higher levels of accountability 
into the sector, as evidenced by the shift to outputs based funding (Department of Communities, Service 
Improvement Measures, 2010). It is reasoned that introducing output funding and reporting, rather than grant 
or outcomes based funding, will provide greater clarity on what is purchased and delivered. Associated with 
this, are amplified monitoring arrangements. There have been a number of attempts to gain a higher level 
of control over the outputs of government funding provision (Duckett and Swerissen, 1996) and the most 
recent efforts arise from a re-examination of the roles, responsibilities and funding regimes in health and 
community services sectors. Affiliated with these initiatives are competitive funding practices which have 
seen large, for-profit providers enter the service space. Coupled with the previous initiatives, and 
particularly pertinent to the need to expand the public and social housing sector, has been a push toward 
the voluntary amalgamation of smaller services to secure greater scale and scope of resources and 
management capacity.  
This situation has been referred to elsewhere as the ‘unknown unknowns’, or the things that we don’t know we don’t 
know (for example, Donald Rumsfeld used the term when discussing the Iraqi arms situation, 12 February, 2002). 
The system is therefore not only difficult to navigate, but many of the risks remain unobserved or unknown until they 
occur. This lack of knowledge about what we don’t know we don’t know, limits capacity to make informed, strategic-
decisions or to develop mitigating strategies. .  
Drawing on evidence from a suite of integration initiatives in Queensland, Australia, the paper tests the previous 
proposition. It commences with an outline of the integration literature, highlighting the complexity of the task and 
points of risk. This is followed by background section that sets the context for the study and the methodology.  The 
findings are highlighted and discussed. Finally, a conclusion is presented.  
INTEGRATION FRAMEWORKS  
Integrated approaches can draw on either vertical or horizontal dimensions to achieve their purpose (Matheson, 
2000; Ling, 2002). Reflecting this duality they are often described as following ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’ models 
(Martinson, 1999). Top-down refers to initiatives emanating from the authoritative core, usually the political or 
strategic leadership levels which flow down to management and service levels. Top-down initiatives are pursued 
principally for the objectives of efficiency and coherency (Ryan, Williams, Charles and Waterhouse, 2008) and entail 
the use of mandate, incentives and other formalised integration mechanisms. By contrast, bottom-up integration 
describes initiatives emerging voluntarily from the service delivery front, often driven by scarce resources, uncertainty 
in the organisational environment as well as a desire for enhanced service outcomes.   
Bottom-up methods draw more deeply upon the establishment of shared problem spaces and agreed solutions and 
point strongly to horizontal integration forms.  Horizontal integration is often used to indicate an ideal or end state, but 
it more accurately represents a continuum or scale of connection that extends from the complete autonomy of 
separate parts (fragmentation) at one end, through a series of graduated steps involving more intensive forms of 
linkage, to a fully integrated system (Konrad, 1996).  Authors have used different categories to denote the levels of 
integration and the types of relationships that can occur between organisations. The terms most frequently used in 
this context are cooperation, coordination and collaboration (Konrad, 1996; Himmelman, 1994); elsewhere referred to 
as the 3Cs (Brown and Keast, 2003; Keast, Brown and Mandel, 2007). While these terms are often used 
interchangeably in the literature and practice, they are increasingly considered to be analytically distinct (Winer and 
Ray, 1994; Konrad, 1996) and therefore located at different points on the continuum. Specifically, cooperation refers 
to low levels of connection based predominantly on shared information; coordination the alignment of resources and 
effort, while collaboration is focused on achieving systems change through dense interdependent relationships 
(Keast et al, 2007).  While the horizontal integration continuum has turned attention to the more strategic linking 
integration purposes to different relationship strengths relationships, its emphasis only on the horizontal dimension 
does not accurately reflect the complexity of integration in practice, and can limit the development of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the complex phenomenon of integration (6, 2004).  
Aligned to the top-down and bottom-up modes, attention has also been directed to the levels at which integration 
occur. Three levels of integration activity have been identified: macro level of policy, strategic planning and financing 
decisions; the meso or middle level involving relationships among services in a region and integration at the 
managerial level; and the micro level, which concerns the direct relationships between practitioners and the people 
they assist (Walfogel, 1997; Kodner, and Spreeuwenber, 2002).  Adopting a stratum approach provides greater detail 
on the practical tasks and tools at each level of integration activity. For example, from top to bottom these initiatives 
can range from funding and incentives, inter-sectoral planning; co-located services and joint training and case 
management. More recently, the breadth and depth of integration initiatives have come to be included in the 
formulation of inter-agency models (Fine, 2001; Glasby and Dickenson, 2008). In this conceptualisation, breadth 
equates to the types or strength of integration arrangements that occur between agencies, linked to, for example the 
3Cs; while depth relates to the extent or degree to which initiatives are spread over a locale, region or state.  
While proving useful in shaping the broad conceptual aspects and directions of joined-up processes, it has been 
argued that the largely singular dimension of each of these frameworks does not adequately reflect the complex and 
often layered approaches generally adopted by joined-up initiatives. In response, a number of authors, for example 
Fine (2001) have combined various elements to produce a multi-dimensional perspective of integration and joined-up 
arrangements. Figure 1 is a model of such an integrated framework, incorporating the elements discussed above.  
Figure 1: Multi-dimensional Integration Framework 
 
Source: Keast, 2011 
As this figure demonstrates integration is a complex, multi-dimensional and often multi-layered process.  These 
factors combine to make the implementation of integration a difficult task, with many junctions or points of 
vulnerability .  For the not-for-profits, with their stronger local and regional practice orientation, the complexity of the 
integrative process, while frustrating, does not disrupt or undermine core work. Governments, however, are required 
to work across a broader bandwidth, covering local, regional, state and national jurisdictions as well as up and down 
the hierarchy. The multi-layered nature of such integration creates ample space for unknown - unknowns to emerge 
and become problematic.  
CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY  
Queensland  
Throughout Queensland’s history periodic efforts have been made by both the government and non-government 
sectors to integrate their work and resources.  It has been argued that these integration efforts were largely transitory 
and superficial (McDonald and Zetlin, 2004), relying predominantly on government fiat or personal relationships 
respectively. However, in the 1980s, worldwide fiscal restraints exposed Queensland’s continued underinvestment in 
community and social infrastructure (Walsh, 1993) and set the scene over the next decades for a renewed interest in 
services integration, supported in part by Commonwealth funding allocations and stipulations. The demands for 
better integrated services were not confined to the social services, with citizen voting patterns signalling an interest in 
one-stop service locations and single points of access for general government information and services as well as 
demands for more involvement in localised decision making (Head, 1999). This was coupled with a growing 
realisation that the state alone could not provide the physical infrastructure necessary for continued prosperity and 
growth and would need to partner with the private sector.  As a consequence, Queensland entered an 
unprecedented period of joined-up and whole-of-government policies and strategies. Many of these relied on the 
direct authority and mandate of the Premier to better integrate policies and services across the state (O’Farrell, 2000; 
Keast and Brown, 2006). Others drew more extensively on the emerging concepts of networks, collaborations and 
partnerships as key integration forms aimed at bringing together the expertise and resources of multiple 
organisations and sectors to address intractable social problems and provide a range of social and physical services 
across geographically dispersed and isolated locations (Reddel, 2002; Government Service Delivery Project, 2000). 
At this time, child safety and homelessness were two arenas singled out for increased integrative effort. The R2H 
Strategy provided $235.52 million over four years. At the core of this strategy was the desire for “homeless people 
have access to an integrated service system that meets their immediate needs and that leads to opportunities for 
connecting with and participating as part of the community” (2005:2). Similarly, disability services and other general 
community based service areas have all been identified as benefiting from a stronger integration, both internal and 
with external providers.  
Thus successive Queensland governments have responded to increasing demands for more integrated and 
responsive policy development and service delivery with a suite of integration initiatives broadly located under the 
banner of joined-up government.  Some of these initiatives have become mainstream processes, while others have 
struggled to gain purchase or were ceased. This Queensland experimentation provides many examples from which 
to examine the context, processes and outcomes of joined-up approaches.   
Methodology 
This paper draws on data generated from a suite of eight initiatives conducted within and across the Queensland 
government and nongovernment sectors between 2000 and 2010. These initiatives, which were all broadly defined 
as having an integrative purpose include: The Government Service Delivery Project; Service Integration Project; 
Chief Executive Officers’ Forum; Reconnect Network; Child-Safety Partnerships; and the Responding to 
Homelessness Strategy (R2H) (2008). These cases were located at different levels of operation: strategic, 
administrative/managerial and practice, allowing for variation in perspectives and experiences (see Table 1 for 
information on the operational level of cases).  
A variety of data collection instruments including semi-structured interviews, focus groups, questionnaires and 
network linkage surveys were used to construct the cases. The focus and type of questions remained uniform across 
all cases, enabling comparative consistency to identify both similarities and differences between programs. The semi-
structured interviews tapped into the respondents’ experiences and expectations of integration, perceptions of 
successes and failures, and core competencies. While the focus groups provided greater detail on respondent 
experiences. The dynamic interaction made possible through the focus group process allowed for greater disclosure 
and for opinions to be challenged. All interviews and focus groups were fully transcribed, coded separately by two 
people working independently and categorised to distil key thematic areas. Leximancer was also used as a 
supplementary textual analysis tool to confirm the manual thematic analysis.  
Finally, a comprehensive array of documentation (public policy and service reports, evaluations and academic 
publications) was examined.  This mix of data gathering instruments allowed for results to be triangulated, with the 
findings from one tool testing and confirming the results of others. In total 181 interviews, 17 focus groups and over 
200 questionnaires were completed.  
The resulting rich data set provides the basis for the findings and discussions which follow.  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This study has revealed three/four key trends arising from the policy mixes: Competition, accountability and upsizing. 
These themes are expanded below.  
Competition vs. Cooperation 
Competition was introduced to the NFP sector as a way to push innovation boundaries and gain greater efficiencies. 
NFPs increasingly experienced pressure to emulate business like practices in order to make them more accountable, 
and therefore attractive to funders, and, ultimately to ensure their survival.  It was acknowledged that competition did 
bring greater efficiencies to the social services environment, by agencies challenging each other to push the 
boundaries of existing service delivery models, thus generating innovative and more resourceful approaches. 
Overwhelmingly, though, completion was seen by respondents as undermining the cooperative gains made by 
agencies over time, particularly in terms of the relationships between agencies which are consistently identified as 
‘core to integration’.  For example, it was stated that as a result of competition policy and funding regimes “[agencies] 
seem to be going back to old habits of self-interest and agency turf protection”.  Where competition was seen as a 
positive element, producing new, more efficient ways of operating, the manner in which it was implemented was 
considered to be problematic and not ‘helpful for integration’.  
Competitive funding is good but often the way it is done is not good because what it does [both state and 
federal] is not being used in a healthy way.  
The point being made here is that competitive funding was being used to set agencies against each other through 
tendering processes.  It was noted that completion did push agencies to vie against each other, thus pushing the 
level of services offered. However, for many, the claims were unrealistic and were likely to be little more than rhetoric.  
People will try to outdo each other …. Beautiful applications but they can’t deliver and they know they can’t 
The experimentation with competition has thrown up some unexpected and even counter-intuitive results.  
Similarly, an earlier reform effort by government which located collaboration not competition as the cornerstone of the 
service model also resulted in a set of unintended outcomes. Perversely, despite a significant funding allocation, the 
initiative backfired and instead of agencies working more closely together as was intended, a situation of higher 
competition broke out. One respondent reflected on the questionable function of money as the sole lubricator for 
collaborative integration:  
As soon as money was raised, instead of working together, some agencies took the joint ideas back to their 
parent organisations and ended up submitting competing proposals. 
The impact of this unexpected behaviour was a fracturing of long-standing working relationships, trust and 
reciprocity. The rent seeking behaviour of a few agencies became the catalyst for the demise of two enduring service 
networks in this region (Keast and Brown, 2006). Network members blamed the expiry of these networks and the 
associated fracturing of relations between organisations on the ‘dumping of funds’ into the sector with poor guiding 
principles and very limited time to build the projects ( 6months), especially when some of the new agencies involved 
had previously competed for funds. The end result was a counter-intuitive damaging consequence which had not 
been expected nor planned for, despite the existence of research which highlighted the potential risks of a poorly 
executed reform process (XXX                                     ).  
Upsizing 
The bulk of social services have conventionally been provided by government, with the not-for-profit sector acting as 
a safety-net, delivering those services that government cannot or will not provide.  These bodies are mostly small in 
size and largely operate from a voluntary ethos. In recent times, however, as a result of the policy changes which call 
for more business-like operating models, the social services sector has become increasingly populated by a set of 
larger NGOs, which are run as businesses (Lyons, 2001).  A recent study of the Australian social services sector 
indicates that in many service arenas, for-profit organisations outnumber not-for-profit organisations (Australian 
Council of Social Services, 2006).   
These larger organisations are able to draw on a wider pool of resources and capabilities than smaller organisations 
and are brought into the mix because of their significant capacity. Smaller organisations within some service 
networks observed that government appeared to be favouring the inclusion of larger agencies into service provision 
arrangements and placing them in administrative positions acting in a pseudo-government capacity. 
Government prefers these big organisations, because they are structured the same as government; they 
operate the same way. The reasoning is that the bigger ones will meet the requirements for stronger 
corporate accountability and will have staff that can monitor these processes.  
The inclusion of larger organisations into the collaborative mix has led to unforeseen tensions. Firstly, smaller 
organisations considered these large NGOs as being hierarchical and that their participation in integrative activities, 
particularly network and coordination group meetings, resulted in an uneven sharing of information around funding 
and the types of services each provided. It was considered that in larger NGOs a bureaucracy and hierarchy existed 
where individuals at the service level were not able to share this information because they had not been made aware 
of the funding regimes they operated under nor did they appear to have a full understanding of the service 
requirements under that funding: 
To tell you the truth, I do have a problem when very big organisations come in. Because a lot of times they 
[new agencies] don’t really have an understanding of the sector at all... They are not connected and don’t 
act as part of our network. 
The tendency for large organisations to be headquartered in capital cities meant that staff were often unable to 
participate fully in local decision making processes. This causes difficulties in terms of immediate decision making 
and resource allocation and was seen to be problematic to local level integration. 
When you are sitting around the table talking about things and planning actions, the small non-government 
agencies … are very open … they tell you everything about their organisation including the funding they get 
and then you get the larger organisations … they can’t necessarily be [open] … [they] can’t talk about the 
funding because they don’t know , so they can’t actually participate. 
Additionally, large NGOs were considered to be taking work away that could be done by existing NFP.  
I don’t know that they need to establish another agency; you know there are other service providers who are 
doing a good job and should be given the opportunity. 
Further, the larger ‘new’ organisations were argued to be undertaking functions that did not add value to the existing 
network. Existing network participants commented that rather than contributing add-on services large new providers 
were implementing new services in which they had little experience and with limited knowledge of how the system 
operated. This has meant that existing services have had to step in to help out, which has placed a higher work load 
on the existing agencies without financial recommence.  
Issues of accountability were also raised. Some existing service providers suggested that these larger NGOs were 
able to attract funding because they had the capacity to write “beautiful applications” which they knew they were 
unable to deliver on. Rather than adding value to the service system, it was considered that new providers were 
having a negative impact on outcomes, including acting as a fragmenting element:   
Bringing in new players [to a sector that is already struggling], who have never been in the homelessness 
sector and that probably was one of the things that didn’t help. 
The data, particularly the network maps, confirms that it was the combination of size and new entry into the service 
provision network that created tensions in relationships. Several networks already consisted of long-serving providers 
that were often offshoots of large NGOs but which featured significantly in the centre of the network maps and were 
highly connected to other agencies. These contradictory findings suggest that it may not be merely the size of the 
organisation that is at issue, but rather how that organisation is structured in terms of devolution. Some large 
religious organisations, for example, created subsidiary organisations that operated relatively autonomously in the 
service system meaning that they were seemingly considered not to be subject to the same rigours of bureaucracy 
that some of the new service providers were considered to operate under. The combination of this mix of 
bureaucratic and flatter structured organisations; confusing terminology and the perceived lack of expertise of new 
service providers not only was considered unhelpful and  rather detrimental in causing on-going disruption to services 
as new actors were ‘brought up to speed’: 
One thing they have realised is that when the brand a new organisation it takes about eighteen months for 
that organisation to settle down, you know to get everyone to know the system and how it works – by that 
time the rest of them are so stretched and strained that it immediately sours any working relationship 
There was also a concern that the ‘bigs’ have sufficient organisational slack and spare resources to be able to 
withdraw from a region, if their initiative was not proving to be financially viable.  Examples were provided where this 
withdrawal has occurred causing a loss of the service to the community. The fear that the large organisations were 
introduced to squeeze out the smalls was quite prominent and was occasionally expressed in terms of an 
acknowledged ‘conspiracy theory’.  While this was often expressed with a tone of humour, there was nonetheless an 
underpinning belief in the truth of the position.  
So, while we might laugh and talk about conspiracy theories, there is a strong sense among many of us that 
that the ‘old’ agencies were staid and not progressive and the desire was to move us on’. 
Amalgamation  
In addition to the introduction of larger organisations to the service mix, there was also a push for smaller agencies to 
join forces through processes of amalgamation and other forms of mergers. It has been argued that the current 
diversity and broad scope of services is not an effective system and, as such, both individual agency as well as 
government objectives can be compromised.  The rationale for this policy agenda is centred on the search for 
efficiency by bringing related services together makes them more cost effective, more accessible and more efficient. 
The agenda is clearly set out by the New South Wales government: 
Service integration through amalgamation and common management of agencies addresses these 
challenges by bringing related services together in a way that makes them more convenient, more 
accessible and more effective. Resources are focused on the real problems the public face – not just those 
a particular agency is set up to address. Activities are better coordinated. In addition, tax dollars are used 
more efficiently, with fewer resources wasted on redundant activities, unnecessary services and partial 
solutions leading to more effective government performance. 
The benefits of such upsizing were acknowledged by some respondents, including “tapping into the potentials of 
scale and scope” for example, sharing management committee members; participating in joint training and other up-
skilling actions.  There was, however, also strong concern expressed that these benefits would come at the cost of a 
diverse and vibrant sector, the very attributes that have made the NFP sector a viable ‘alternative’ and ‘safety-net’ for 
government for many years.   
It was noticeable that several networks of agencies have sought to achieve integration and efficiency through the 
application of alternative strategies to amalgamation. The Reconnect Program and the Gold Cost Homelessness 
Networks, for example, have both turned to incorporation as a substitute approach in response to government ‘policy 
and funding pushes’. The Reconnect Network became incorporated in 2004, following strong policy pressures from 
the Queensland state government for agencies to become ‘more collaborative’. Although seemingly falling in with the 
government agenda it was explicitly stated by members of this network that they were adopting a collaborative 
approach despite the goals of government. Further, rather than being ‘tools of government’ and adopting 
government’s model, they were going to develop a collaboration model that worked best for their situation.  
And so we moved to this new collaborative model, not because government required this and made it a 
condition of funding. We did it because it was the right thing to do. We also moved early, to make sure that 
we controlled what it looked like, how it worked and what it stood for.  
In this way, even though government set a clear imperative for integrative action around a collaborative process, they 
were unable to fully manage or control the implementation process.  Convergence around the goal of integration, 
rather than government influence, reduced the risk of failure. Thus, a lack of strategic level understanding of the local 
system by higher level bureaucrats; their lack of intelligence and monitoring of the operating environment, its links 
and history is an ongoing threat to the goal of integration.   
Accountability  
Accountability is a cornerstone principle of government, with government agencies and personnel, including 
ministers, arguably answerable to the constituency for the quality of funds spent. Accountability is described as “the 
duty to provide an account …or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible” (Gray, et al., 1996:38). 
Respondents, although acknowledging the fundamental need for their decision-making processes, actions and 
outcomes to have a level of clarity and transparency, also suggested that it produces negative as well as positive 
consequences and that the former were often ‘cloaked in the complexity of the system in which we [service providers] 
work”.  
 In relation to the positive perspective, NFP service provider agencies largely agreed that accountability and 
transparency was important to the continued good functioning of the sector. It was acknowledged that money from 
government “... comes with strings attached” and therefore there is an“.... obligation to perform in terms of the 
agreement made”.  The increased demand for accountability and transparency was welcomed by the majority of 
respondents, as is exemplified in this statement:  
From my point of view, if we are funded to do something then we must do what we are funded for. 
However, for many the object or recipients of this accountability differed from government. For instance, most NFP 
agencies saw that they were first of all responsible to their clients, not government. It was suggested that this was 
something that government actors often did not know, or worse forgot or overlooked.  Unless this apparent 
disconnect between the two foci of responsibility is overcome it will be difficult for government to gain commitment to 
the need for accountability. The finding also points to the potential risks of the imposition of ‘corporate’ style 
accountability which requires more onerous reporting obligations that impinge on the limited funds available to 
agencies to provide services. For many NFP there was a real concern that current policy and service regime is 
antithetical to social work values. Leat (1988) also cautions that too great an emphasis placed on the limited target 
count type accountability regimes, without also addressing public benefit outcomes, would undermine the social side 
of social services delivery and threaten the very values which the NFP sector brings to the service delivery table:  
independence, flexibility, responsivity and diversity. As Wapner (2002: 159) stresses overemphasis on accountability, 
unavoidably results in not-for-profits that “cease to be effective non-government organisations” (emphasis in original). 
Wolch (1990) has termed this isomorphism as the ‘shadow government’.  
As well as cynicism about which, how and if outcomes are measured, there was a concern as to whether 
government is fully aware of the outcomes achieved. In one service network that had operated over a 
number of years, a view was expressed that government failed to recognise the good work that had been 
done in the past and the outcomes of earlier integrative arrangements.  
The lack of information available about the role and funded responsibilities of individual agencies was also 
presented as a core accountability problem. That is, there is a lack of transparency about who is paid to do 
what. This situation, it was argued, was exacerbated by continued funding changes, which required 
organisations to shift or fudge their functions so that they aligned with previous or preferred work. The 
consequences of this are set out below:  
We can’t keep altering our criteria not letting other people know. Everyone is really confused about what 
others are doing.... and some are clearly not doing what they should – they are cherry picking – and it 
places greater pressure on those of us who are left to pick up the work and if you can’t do it then the clients 
get angry. 
In this way, there was a clear sense of frustration expressed by many respondents that some of their service 
contemporaries were not performing as agreed.  Over time this was considered to be very detrimental to the 
relationships – the trust and reciprocity – that provide the foundation for integration on the ground.  There was also 
an understanding, true or perceived, that the new and amplified accountability process presented as an expeditious 
way for government to alter current funding allocations.  
They [funding body] are saying that it brings about more accountability and before they were saying that the 
way the funding agreements were done they couldn’t actually de-fund another organisation easily if things 
went really wrong.  
The reason why they were going to a new system, because if people are not performing it is easy to get the 
funds and give it to an area that is efficiently managing it.  But it takes years and years to de-fund. 
Again, this was seen as both a positive and a negative consequence. Positive in the sense that poor performance is 
no longer tolerated, thus leading to overall improvement in the sector. Negative in that, rather than redirect the funds 
to other performing local agencies, there has been a tendency to engage big organisations. The assumption here is 
that larger equates with more accountability:  
if is easier for [name] to give the money to another agency. I don’t think they need to establish a new 
agency. There are many other services out there doing a good job and they are already in the system 
When government overlayed new services, introduced new service providers into the existing network and increase 
the level of scrutiny introduced higher scrutiny restructured the network along the lines of other regions, it was widely 
considered that this was a ‘slap in the face’ for the existing service and a failure by government to recognise the good 
outcomes of earlier integrative efforts. For service providers it was also evidence that government had failed to listen 
to their recommendations and did not understand that a system successfully operating in one arena may not be 
appropriate in others: 
The government came and announced what was going to happen ... they didn’t really listen to what a lot of 
us were saying about what was needed in this area, and there was a tendency to replicate what was 
happening [elsewhere] ... It wasn’t really consultation at that time, it was really more information about what 
was going to happen, and there are clearly lots of different paths. 
This programmatic push down of a system not only ostracised existing service providers, but also set the foundation 
for adversely affecting existing relationships and causing suspicion of both government and the new players 
introduced to the sector at that time.  
The ongoing changes in funding arrangements and therefore the nature of the services to be provided by 
participating agencies has caused problems for integration as clarity regarding which new entrants are funded and 
the exact nature of the services new entrants are funded to provide. Whereas existing service providers who have 
collaborated over many years have developed a common language and therefore an understanding of what is meant 
by the terminology used, as new entrants enter the field shared understanding is lost as language and terminology 
are used to denote different things. In the homelessness service sector, for example, a new agency was funded to 
provide an expanded suite of services for “early intervention”. This terminology was understood by existing service 
providers as meaning something different to what it was now intended to mean: 
No further back, their [new provider’s] definition is, and I think this is a problem ... because early intervention 
and prevention in [this network] means something different than it does in a medical model. 
Such misunderstandings about who is funded and for what purpose subsequently led to confusion and concern 
around accountability and about who was charged with providing the service that was thought to be funded: 
After a while this is how relationships break down ... because you really get frustrated and staff get annoyed  
... but they don’t do what they have to do (other agencies) and you are the one that is supposed to be 
picking up all these things, and you can’t do it and then the clients get angry at you and everyone is ringing 
up and getting annoyed for something that you are expected to do but are not funded to do it. But I’m 
confused not the money but about the purpose of the money, It is reactive, it doesn’t seem to be anything 
different to what we have been doing for the last however long and we haven’t been able to change 
anything in the past and we just keep doing the same things and that just confuses me a lot and sometimes 
I’m just amazed - a new program’s started up and I think why? 
The analysis of these cases indicates that the two sets of integration policy objectives – connectivity and efficiency - 
that are in place to guide and enhance social services provision in Queensland (and elsewhere) have created a 
complex and, often, contested operating environment. The complicated sets of interdependencies that take place 
between services and programs create difficulties in navigating the system with any certainty and, as has been 
identified in the cases, the ensuing fragmentation makes it difficult to identify connections between issues and makes 
‘unknowable’ the potential consequences.  It has also been shown that as a result of this complex and contested 
context, there are a number of unintended consequences of well-intended actions and policies. Although, hidden, 
these are actively working against both stated goal sets. As has been noted:  
…. with competition has come even more fragmentation between agencies and sectors; no one is willing to 
cooperate, to share, when there is a risk of free-riding. 
We are probably more competitive now, even though we are meant to be working as a collaboration. 
It has been suggested that rather than being unknown, unknowns some of these risks, challenges and opposing 
outcomes could have been circumvented through deeper analysis and stronger dialogue between the involved 
actors.  Disturbingly, though, and in line with the earlier conspiracy theorists perspectives, there are some  who 
contend that some of these unknown, unknowns are in fact known, yet are ignored or downplayed because they do 
not sit well with current directions and/or government agencies experience escalation of commitment to a course of 
action due to significant resource and political investment.  Hefferran (2010) has termed this first condition ‘blind 
optimism’ and stresses that it can have critical impacts. The continuing interplay of competition and cooperation as 
integration tools, despite available knowledge of the often negative impact on the sector, certainly fits this position.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The dynamic, interdependent, complex and highly uncertain operating environment of the human services sector, 
where reforms are often piled on top of each other with little apparent consideration about how they link or impact on 
each other, is an ideal incubator for unpredictable outcomes. The end result has been a complex mix of polices and 
service models, some of which, it is argued, may produce unintended, and unexpected negative consequences that 
undermine or work directly against the stated objective of integration. Governments, and to a degree not-for-profits, 
are increasingly unable to navigate or respond to the growing complexity and fragmentation that has been created, or 
predict the risks that mixed policies and service models may generate. Most of the impact, however, will be felt in the 
community, at the service delivery level. Although armed with a deep commitment to the cause and a detailed 
understanding of the patterns of relationships and overlap between agencies, they too struggle to identify and 
circumvent the risks associated with unknown, unknowns.  
The paper finds that government’s efforts to externalise risk of service provision to the non-government sector, 
without including them more directly in the planning and decision-making processes, leads to fragmentation of the 
service system and fractured collaborative capability.  These unintended outcomes themselves have the unintended 
consequence of leaving governments disconnected from the service system and unable to provide the leadership 
role and direction necessary for sustained integration.  Moreover, facilitating such a leadership role is undermined by 
behaviours that are directly contrary to collective integration models.  
Current decision-making and policy processes, which are still largely embedded in a linear problem-solving and 
analysis framework, are unable to keep pace with the level of change and the increasing interdependencies that are 
present in the sector.  Actors from both government and the NFP sector must challenge themselves to go outside of 
the box in their thinking and analysis of the potential implications of proposed new changes and their intersection and 
overlay on existing processes.  There is a need to ‘cast the information search net’ wider and involve a broader array 
of actors in the policy development and implementation process, including the NFP who often bring a grounded and 
alternative perspective to the decision-making table, thus rounding off the information set. There is also an urgent 
need to accept that old decision-making processes, based on linear models, are no longer appropriate in highly 
complex and interdependent service arenas, such as the social services. The limitations of the past as a reliable 
predictor for all future events have been aptly pointed out by Taleb (2007).  To halt some of the impact of the 
unknown unknowns, more time and effort must be directed to in-depth and expansive analysis.  
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Table 1:  
 
Case  Operational 
Level  
Initiator 
Mode  Integration focus  Integration tools  Membership 
Chief Executive 
Offers Forum  
Strategic 
Government 
 
Top/Down Coherency of 
government 
policies and 
services; increased 
efficiencies and 
economies  
 
Mandate of Premier 
institutional procedures 
& reporting; coupled 
with relationship 
building & shared 
values 
CEOs of human 
services state 
government 
departments  
Government 
Service 
Delivery 
Project  
Managerial 
Government  
Bottom/Up whole‐of‐
government 
framework to 
support more 
effective, and more 
integrated service 
delivery to the 
government and 
the community 
Institutionalised – 
culture; training, 
relationship building 
and network events 
 
 
Government  
(state) 
Departments 
and some Peak 
bodies  
 
Responding to 
Homelessness  
Strategy  
Strategic 
Government 
 
Top/Down Integrated service 
system; seamless 
services for clients; 
greater efficiency 
& effectiveness of 
service delivery; 
cost savings  
Federal & state policy & 
funding allocation; 
centralised service 
structures;  coupled 
with networked & hub 
service models; joint 
case management, 
integrated service 
outreach 
Government, 
community & 
for‐profit   
Service 
Integration 
Project 
Goodna 
Managerial 
Government 
& Practitioner 
 
Bottom/Up Integrated service 
system; reduce 
duplication & 
overlap;  
new form of 
regional 
governance  
Shared goals, language 
& resources 
Linked to vertical 
authority & sponsors 
Government 
(state & local) & 
community  
Child Safety 
Zonal 
Partnerships  
Strategic 
Government  
Top/Down Regional service 
integration; linking 
of government & 
community 
programs 
State funding 
allocations & policy; 
coupled with  
networked models 
Government 
(state & local) 
and community 
sector  
Reconnect 
Project  
Strategic 
Government 
and 
Community  
 
Top/Down Seamless service 
delivery; reduce 
duplication & 
overlap 
Federal funding for 
networked service 
model); coupled with 
shared missions & 
resources & joint case 
management   
Government 
(fed, state & 
local)  and 
community 
sector 
 
